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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
C. G. RENSHAW,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
TRACY LOAN & rrRUST COMpANY, a corporation, as reeeiver for \VALKER BROTHERS DRY G 0 0 D S COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 5339

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
\Valker BPothers Dry Goods, a Utah corporation,
operated a large retail department store in Salt Lake
City for nearly two generations. It \Vas oue of the oldest
and leading- mercantile establishments of the western
seetion of the United States, aud had been owned by the
Walker family until November, 1928 (Abstract 47;
Transeript 53) when E. F. Dreyfous acquired stock control.
.J. R. \Yalker, was elected President and
(li red or in 190:~ ( Ahs. G9; \Y alker Trans. 30) aud
occupied those positions even after the eontrol of the
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corporatio11 passed to Drcyfous (Abs. 7H; \Vnlkcr 'frans.
38). ]'rom 190::3 io November 1!)28 he was the active
head of the Lusi11css, but after tltat date, Dreyfous completely ordered its destinies ( Abt-:. t-JO; \V alker 'frans. 3!))
and the plaintiff \V alker, was "only a figure head."
Following the entry of Dreyfous into the corporation, the store building of the company in 8alt Lake City
was remodeled at an expenditure of $:320,000.00 (Abs.
79; Walker Trans. 39). Finaneial tlifficulties followed
which resulted in the appointment of Tracy Loan & 'l'rust
Company, a corporation, as equity receiver for the company and the properties by the Disb·iet Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for 8alt Lake County on
June 25, 1930. The receiver qualified and immediately
entered into possession of the assets and business of
the company and for a temporary period e1ontinued the
operation of the department store business.
At least twenty-five years prior to the receivership,
the company <:>stablished a praciiee of encouraging its
employees to "deposit" their surplus funds or savings
with the company ( Abs. ;);j; 'rraw-;. 41). These funds
were repayable on demm1d (Abs. 77; Walker 'frans. 36)
and the company paid li'jr, interest per annum ( corupouuded semi-annually) (Abs. 22; Trans. 30). The "deposits" vrer'e evidenced by a small Look which simply
bore the imprint "\Valker Br>others Dry Goods Co."
(Exhibits A and H). No rules or regulations covering
the so-called deposits were printed in tlw hook nor is
there any evidence that ;my regulations ever cxistecl, ex-
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cept a general understandiug of the agreement of the
company. In 1929 these ''deposits'' amounted in total
to about $4-1,000.00 (Abs. 33; Trans. 41). Iu 1924 they
amounted to $60,514.55 (Abs. 74; -Walker rrrans. 34).
]'or yean; the company paid or credited the earned interest ou the respeetive accounts of the employees (Abs.
49; Trans. 54). rt'he funds were "withdrawable" on demand of au employee (Abs. 22; Trans. 30). (Abs. 77;
\Valker 'l'rans. 36).
After Drcyfous acquired control of the business these
::;o-called '' (leposits '' we1·e reduced hy repayment to the
"depositors".

-When the receiver was appointed the

total of sueh "deposits" amounted only to $14,688.63,
(Abs. 45 aud 4G; rrrans. 52).

It also appears that the

eompany employees from time to time reeeived verbal
assuranc·e from the coutrol accountant of the company
that their funds on deposit wore "absolutely safe and
if anything ever happened to the store, they would be
paid in preference to any one" (Ab:-3. 22; Henshaw Trans.
30; Ab~:>. 31; Trans. 56). The accountant claims to have
given these assuranecs to the employees at the instance
and under the orders of ,J. R
alkcr, when he
was manager of the business and that Dreyfous, after he
became manager, also directed that she inform the employees to t ht) same effect. ( Abs. 27; Trans. :)5). However, thrre was no written agreement entered into hy
tho company erecting any spel·ific trust fund protecting
these "deposits'' of the employees, nor attempting to

-w
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make the "deposits" preferred claims m event of msolvency of the company.
The employees "<leposi ted'' tlwir funds from time
to time and in eaeh book, which was hel<l by the employee, the amount of the "deposit" was acknowledg·etl.
Interest credits were shown in like manner in the books
(Exhibits A and B.) 'I' he funds were received from the
employees by the company at its regular cashier's window or were paid to the control aceountant at her desk
(Abs. 30; Trans. :18 and :39). The "deposits" were never
ear-marked. (Ahs. 31; '11 ram;. 40). 'rhe company maintained commer-cial bank aceounts in several of the Salt
Lake City banks (Abs. :lO; Trans. il9) awl funds of the
company received. in the operation of its large business
and the employee ''deposits'' were depol:lited in these
banks. (Abs. :30; Trans. :39). In making these hauk deposits there wai:l no distiuction made as to funds received from the empl·oyees on "deposit'' awl the funds
representing general ineome from lmsi11ess operations.
(Abs. 29, 30 awl :31; 'rram;. ilH, :m and 40). All woney
that was received at the store of the <•,ompany was deposited \vithout clistind.1ou as to its source. J1Jmployees
''deposits'' were intermi11gle<l vvith general income and
deposited (Ahs. :3D, 40 and 41; 'Prans. 47, 48, 4H) in the
commercial banks. 'rhe obligations of the eompauy were
paid out of the eornmereial bank deposits of the company. There 'vas no special ba11k aecou11t l'epresentingouly the fnuds of employees "derJOsite<l" "·itl! thu eOlupany, and when an employee desired io "withdraw"
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funds from the company, he was paid by check drawn
on any one of the banking depositories of the company.
No special bank account wa:,; used for this purpose (Abs.
41 and 42; Trans. 48 and 4D). There was a complete intermingled and confusion of the employee:,; "deposits"
with ihe general funds of the corporation. (Abs. :34;
'rrans. 42) (.A-bs. 41; Trans. 48).
Early iu the ~Walk or administration of the company
the corporation books showell these employees "tleposits" as a liability under the tiile of "On deposit"
(Abs. 25; Trans. 33). A certified accountant questioued
the practice as partaking ·of the nature of a banking
business, whereupou the ledger at·count caption was
ehanged to "Cash uue Employees." On the balance
sheets of the company tho amount due the total employees was always showu as a Jiabil·ity, and it was 11ever
represented as a trust fund or a preferred elaim (Abs.
71 ; \valkcr 'rrans. :~2; Abs. :J~); 'r raus. 47). Dming the
Dreyfous administratiou the practice remained the same,
except that there was an individualization of the accounts
insteau of carryiug but one nceount in the general accounting set of the company. (Abs. :38; •:rrans. 45).
The company, for years, placed its surplus fnuds in
time certificates of deposits issued and negotiated by
the commercial banks with wllicl1 it did business. (Abs.
76; vV alker Trans. :36; Ahs. 48, Trans. ;~4). Wht>u the
credit balance i11 favor of ilw <·ompauy at a particular
bank accumulated beyond a ecrtaiu point, a time c<~rti
ficatc of deposit would be secured (Abs. 32; Trans. 40;
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Abs. 2(); 'l'raus.

+:~)

from the hank.

'l'he:,;e time deposit

certificates were for six or twelve mouths (Abs. ~~();
'l'rans. 43), a ud Uwy rep res en ted excess emL'l'geuey fuwh;
of Uw company (Abs. 2D; 'l'rans. ::W). 'l'hey represented
at one time a sum greatly i11 excess of the company's
liability to its employees for ilwir so-called "deposits"
(Abs. 35; Traus. 43). [u ]~)24 at the time of the compan~·
audit, the employees "savings accounts" carried a
lia1)ility of $60,514.55 (Abs. 74; \Valker Trans. :34). 'l'he
company ha<l time deposits of $42,47().00 (Abs. 7(); Walker Trans. 35) a cashier's elwek of $10,000 and a special
bank acconut of $17 ,08:-UIG. These 1·epresenied a reserve
''to take care of any mnergeney '' ( Abs. 77; Walker
'l'rans. 36).
In purchasing these time certificates of deposit the
company did uot car-mark funds received fron1 its employees as saviugs or "on deposit" al\(l buy a special
certificate of deposit with :,;m·h funds (Ab:,;. :n; 'l'rans.
40). 8uch funds went into the eo1npany's ge11eral hank
aecou11ts indiscrimi11ately, along with other fum1s of the
eompany (Ahs. :32; Trans. 40), and when the balance at
any bank <wcurnulated to a point as to permit the purchase of a tinw eertificate, tl10 certificate was acquired.
(Abs. 3:2; rrrans. 40). 'l'he ecrtifieates carried no inllicatiou on their fac.e ihat they were for auy particular
purpose. At the time of the appointment or the reeeiver,
no time eertificates iu favor of tlw <·ompauy existed (Ahs.
;)7; Trans. 44). 'J'hey hnd heeu previous1y cashed and
the proeeed:,; used by ihe corporation iu its business.
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'L'he plaintiff, C. G. Renshaw, was a trusted employee
of the company for 38 years. During all of this period
of time he maintained a "deposit" account with the company ( Abs. 50; Trans. 56). At the time of the appointment of the receiver there was due Renshaw from the
company on account of ilwse deposits the sum $8,370.52.
Plaintiff's first cause of action is based on this claim
(Abs. 45; Trans. 52).
May Salisbury was also an old and valued employee
of the company alHl during !Jer long periotl of service
she also had a "deposit" aeeount with the company (Abs.
52; Trans. 57). \Vhen the receiver took eharge there was
due her from the company the sum of $2,852.22 (A~)S. 45;
Trans. 52). Miss Salisbury, after filing her claim with
the reeeiver, assigned her claim to plaintiff and it is the
basis of his seeond cause of action.
Both Renshaw and Miss Salisbury were personally
assured from time to time that "you've got nothing to
worry about, your money is absolutely safe." (Abs. 51;
Trans. 56 and Abs. 23; Trans. ;n) and that "their money
was absolutely safe, that they could draw it any time
* * * and if anything ever happeued to the store, they
would be paid in prefereneu to any ono." (Abs. 22;
Trans. 30). These assurances awl statements were made
by the control acc-ountant of the company who had eharge
of the employee "Deposits" (Ahs. 22; Tram;. :-ll). The
aceountant claimed slw did so on tlw orders of Walker
while he was manager (Abs. 28; Trans. 35) and of Drey-

fous after he became direl'ting head of' the business (Ab:::.
23; Trans. 31 and 32).
r:l1 here is uo evidmwe that t>ither Henshaw or Miss
Salisbury ever reeeive<l any special eou(raet or agreement pertaining to their "<1Pposits." It appcan; that all
umployeel:l making "<luposits" were treatL•d alike awl
the arraugemen ts purtai 11 ing to the Renshaw and Salisbury aceounts were in all respect1-l the same as those relating to "deposits" of other employees. The fads here-inabove related as t,o the practiee and arrangements
governing these employee "deposits" apply ·with especial force to these tw,o aceounts.
After appointment of defendant as receiver of Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company, hotl1 Reushaw and
Salisbury filed their respedive proof:-; of claim:-; with :-;aid
receiver v\ri thin the time ordered by the Com( ]m ving
eharge of the reeeiver:-;hip proceedings. 'l hey hot h set
forth in their separate proofs of C'laim that their respective claims were prcfened and entitled to full paymeut
before the commou ereditors of' the insolvent eorporatiOII
were entitled to particpate i11 n diHtrilmtion of the n'eeivership asse(H. rrhe defendant receiver refused to
allow the claims as preferred (•laims, hut approved samu
as commou claims without prefereJWl'. 'l'hereupou the
court, iu which the receivership proeeerlings \n>re awl
are pending, onlered Renshaw awl Salisbur~· to institutu
and prosecute pleHary adions agaiuHt tile defendant reePiver to <letermim· if a prel'erem·e existed iu thl~ir favor
whic·h would elltitle tlwuJ io full p<1ymellt of ilwir claims
1
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before common creditors of the receivership estate would
be entitled to participate. Tl1is present action is such
plenary actiou. In the receivership proceedings the court
ordered the defendant reeeiver to set up a reserve of cash
funds of $11,268.33 to protect the creditors of the receivership estate \Vho are employee "depositors" as
herein desiguated and deseribed, in the event it was finally determined they were entitled to payment of their
claims in full. 'J'he court further rlirected the reeeiver t~o
pay to these creditors elaiming preferenee, the same
dividends as were paid common creditors as and when
such dividends were paid, without prejudice as to either
the receivt~r and creditors claiming prefenmce. The receiver h1as earried out the order of the <~ourt in all respeds. 'J'he reserve fund has been ereaLed and the employe "cleposit~ors" have been paid dividends in the same
proportion as common creditor's (Abs. ~0; 'J'rans. Hi).
The trial court in this adiou found that the assets of
\Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company are insufficient
to pay general creditors more than approximately 55/r)
of the amount of sueh claims allowed hy tlw Receiver
( F'inding V; Abs. 90; Trans. Hi).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ARGUMENT

8pecial NateThe Renshaiu claim (first cause of actirm) a11d the
Salisbury daim (second cause of action) at·e sirnilar in
all nospeds e:rcept as to (l/JI owtl s t lu'1'C a/ al/(1 it was sf ipulatcd i-n open cou.rt (Abs. 32; 'J.1nms. :J7) ·'that .1vliss Sal-
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isuury woutd testify the same as th:s tuitness (Rensha1c)
·with reference to h·r deposits." There/on', as a ·n1atter
of co1tueni.cuce and breuif:l/' this brief treats the situatio•J!
as if bu.{ o11e cause of action existed. Wherei'CJ' the ·u·orrls
"plaintijj''' rn- "Rcudw.lf'" arc used they iucludc uoth
Reushaw a·nrl Salisuury. The two causes of acl'ion must
stand or fall together, as the facts pertain;11!J to them
are identical.

I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PREFERENCE OR
PRIORITY IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS CLAIM BY
DEFENDANT RECEIVER, BECAUSE (a) THE RELATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND WALKER
BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY WAS ALWAYS
THAT OF CREDITOR AND DEBTOR; AND (b) THE
SO-CALLED "DEPOSITS" MADE BY PLAINTIFF
WITH THE COMPANY DID NOT CREATE A TRUST
FUND. THEY CREATED AND REMAINED ALWAYS A SIMPLE CONTRACT DEBT DUE FROit'I
THE OOMPANY TO PLAINTIFF.
Appcllaut's aHsignrrHmts of unor No:-o. 1, 2, :~, 4, 5, G,
7 (a, b, c, d, e, f and p;), tl (a and c),~) (a and b), 10,
11, 12, 1:1, 14, 13 (a, b, (', !l. e, f ami g), Hi (a ;:mel c), 17
(a, b) all(! li-l involve tlte fon~going propositioll. rrhere-

fore, as a ma ttPr of
together.

eoHveuiullC'(~

t huy may bu discusse<l

Assig11meuts No:-o. 2, ::, 10 and 11 arc dircded agaim;t
Findings No. 4 of both fir·s1 ami seeonu eauses of a·ctio11,
which are identical and ore as follows:
"That ai tlw 1inw of makiug said deposits,
and throughout the time of plaintiff's employment
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by said company, the said company :,;olieite<l :,;aid
plaintiff and other employees to so depo,sit their
money with said company, and guaranteed :,;aid
plaintiff and the ·other employees of said company
that said employees, and particular!~· said plaintiff, could draw their money out at any time, together with interest at the r1ate of G;!c) per annum,
ealculated semi-annually, and represented and
stated that their money was always absolutely same and that said employees so depositing had a preference over all othn persons and creditors as to the moneys so deposi1(~d
with said \Valker Brothers Dry Goods Company,
and that said moneys so deposited would be held
by said \v;alker Brother's Dry Goods Compan.'i.
as a trust fund in order to encourage their said
employees to save their money; that said representations on the part of said ~Walker Brothers
Dry Goods Company, were so made to said plaintiff before and during all the time that said plaintiff deposited said money with said ~Walker Brothers Dry Go·ods Company, and continued to be
made until the time of the appointment of the
defendant as receiver of said \Valker Brothers
Dry Goods Company, by reason of all of whieh
the said Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company,
at the time of the appointment of the defendant
as such receiver was indebted to said plaintiff in
the said sum of $8,370.52. ''
Assignments Nos. 4, 5, 12 'and 13 are direded against
E'indings No. 5 of both firsi and seeond causes of action,
which are identi·cal and are as follows:
"That during all of the time that said plaintiff was so deposiJiug mm1e.'· witl1 the SJaid \Valker
Brothers Dry Goods Compa11y, :,;aid plaintiff lH~
lieved said representations nnd relied thereon: hy
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rea::;ou of the relatiou::-;hip ol' said plaiuti IT as nu
employee of ::-;aid company, sairl plaiu!iff was eu1i!led (o rely upon sue II represeuta!ions and all
of them and that hy rea~>on of said represen!atiolls
~>aid plaintiff believed, at the tinw of making ::;nell
deposits awl throughout !he r·ourse of hi:-; said
employment awl uu!il tlw time of 1lw appointmrmt
of the defendant as receiver of said company, that
his money so deposited with :-;aid eumpuny was
safe, and that it c0lt Htituted a prefr'tTed claim
over all other claims against said \\'alker Brother:'! Dry Goods Company <llld against all,\' awl all
other claims except those of a similar kiml
against the defewlmrt as receiver of said \Yalker
Brothers Dry Good~> Company, aiHl said claim for
said amount, made by said plaiutiff, eonstitutes
a first preferred claim agaiust said receiver a,.;
sueh; that within the time provided by order of
this court i11 said rer·eivcr,shi'p nwt!cr, sairl plaiutiff rluly presented hit-: said (•laim to !he said rPceiver and claimed a preference over all other
claims against said rer·r'iVPl' <'X('t~pt 1lto:-;u of a
similar kind, and that said receiver approvr~d said
claim agaiust :-;nirl receiver in tlw full <llll0Ull1
thereof, but ha:-; always refused to approve ~mid
claim as a pref'enerl elnim, aud said receiver rc~
fuses to pay said amount as a prcf<~nud claim
aml n~fnscs (o pay said plnintilT any amount ill
c~xcess of tlw perl'cutage !hat said rceeivcr will
pny tlw gcnentl en~ditors of said Walker Brothers Dry Goods Company aml from the nssets of
said l'Oillpany and frolll the 8Ul11S in the hanrls oJ'
the receiver, the o:airl rc(~eiver will uot be able to
pa,\' tlre genera] (']'editors of said \Valker Bro! hers
Dry GoodH Compauy, more than substantially G5'1{
of the amount ol' sueh clailll due suelr <~l'Pdi!ors."
1

Assigumcnts Nos. (i, 7 (a, h,

l',

d, r', f and g), 14 aJI(l

13 (a, h, c, d, e, f and g) arc directed against :F'imlings
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No. H of both fin;t and second causes of
identical and are as follows:

ac~iion,

which are

"The said claim of said plaiutiff consiitnkc;
a preferred elaim against said n~l~t>in~r, and that
the money deposited by plaintiff, as alleged iu his
complaint, was depositctl with Ow said ~Walker
Brothers Dry Goorls Company, a corporation, as
a trust fund and reecived hy :-;aid company as
such."
As to each of ,said Findings (in each cause of action)
Nos. 4, 5 and 8, the Appellant asserts that (a) the tria]
court erred in making the Fi11ding as a matter of law;
and (!J) that the evidence in the case is 1vholly insufficient to support said li'indings or eiJ.her of them.
Assignment1s Nos. 1, 9 (a and b), lG (a and c) and
17 (a and b) attack the trial court's Oondusions of l,a\V
and .Judgment (in both causes of action) deelaring that
plaintiff's claim is preferred ami is entitled to priority
in payment.
A::;signment No. 18 i:,; direeied against the trial
court ',s ad.ion in overruling defendant's objection to introduction of cvidenee based on plaintiff's eomplaiut.
Plaintiff'::; rclati·on to vValker Brothers Dry GooJs
Company from first to last was that of creditor aud
debtor. Plaintiff's evideucc fnlls far :,;hort of establishing a trust relationship in reganl to the so-called "depo::;its" made by plaintiff with the comrm11~'. In this
connediou it is interesting to twit• that throughout
plaintiff's t•a:,;e eonstant reference is marle to ''dl'posits."
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At no point did the plaintiff 110r hi:,; wit1wsses make any
reference to "trust funds". 'l'lw constant u:,;e of tlli:,;
term aiHl that of "savings" by iJ1e pla·intiff in l1is ow11
testimony (Aus. 30 und 31; '11 ran:,;. riG and 57) inclieater:,;
that plaintiff at all times had a definite idem as to what
he was doing. Uwloubtcdly he recognized in hi:,; transactions with tlle company the same clement:.; as arc involved in "dcposiiiHg" nwncy in a ·savings Lank. It is
established law thai the legal relation between a depositor and the savings bank whieh takes his morwy j:..; that
of debtor and creditor. (See authorities cited infra) .
•Jnst as a saving's depositor loans his Inoney to his savings bank, the plaintiff Ioaned his funds Lo the company.
The company borrowed from him as it di<l from uauking
ins,titutions. 'Phe unsecured banks \Yhich loaned their
funds to tbe eompany oocupy the same 1wsition as that
of plaintiff.
ln order to escape from this situation and place himself in the posiiriml of eL~stui qup trust alHl the company
in that ·Of trustee, plaintiff in bis complaiiJL and evidence
relies. upou two propositioll'S:
(a) 'rhat iuusmuch as he was au emplroyee of the
company, and tlw ndation O'f master and servant existe<l
between him and the compml.\', it follow:-; that with reganl to his loans to tile company that a fidueiary or confidential relationship al:,;o c•xisted between them; aml
(b) 'rhat relying upon assurmwes of the company,
that "our saviugs wa:-; abl'olulely safe, awl if anything

ever lmppe1wd to the :-;lore we would get our money in
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prefenmce to any one else" (Ahs. 51; '!'ram;. 37) he
made the loans to the eompauy aud allowed his savmgs
to remain loaned to tho company.

lu other words, he omleavors to nuse a '' coustrueti ve" trust in his favor, with his "doposi ts" cousti tniing
the trw.;i fund or estate.
1.

"A CONSTRUCTIVE TltUST, OR AS FRI<JQUENTLY
CALLED, AN INVOLUNTARY TRUST, IS A FICTION
OF EQUITY, DEVISED TO THE ENDS THAT THE
EQUITABLE RE'MEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST A
CONVENTIONAL FIDUCIARY MAY BE AVAILABLE
UNDER THE SAMF~ NAME AND PROCESS AGAINST
ONE WHO THROUGH FRAUD OR MISTAKE OR BY
ANOTHER MEANS EX MALF_:n<'ICIO ACQUiltES PROPERTY OF ANOTHER."

Perry ou 'l'rusts (6th :BJditiou) 1GG;
:3 Pomeroy Equi t_,- .J u risprudt~w·o (4th J1;d.)
1044;
(;alifornia Trust Co. v. Cohu,
300 Pac. (Cal.) 8J:J;
Chadwick v. Arnold, :::l4 Utah 48, !:J:J Pa<'. G:27:
Lawley v. HinckonloopPr, :212 Pa'c.
(Utah) at p. 52D;
Salina Canyon Coal Co. v. Klemlll,
76 Utah 372, 290 Pac. 161;
'l'ooele County Board v. Iladlock,
11 Pa,c. (2nd) 322.
From the foregoing authorities it is obvious thai
fraud is oue of the necessary elements in order to enable
a court to "raise" a cons truc·tive "trust." 'I' he co uri
in truth does not "t'l'<'ate" a tmsl: il simply admiuislt'J's
tmst remedies in its effort to \York out justice. 'fhc' lc•nu

16
"fraud", a::; here use<l, memr::; legal frau<l-not a breach
of confiderwe or of ethies.
2.

THE ASSURANCES OR "REPRt£SENTATIONS" GIVEN
BY THE COMPANY TO PLAINTIFF WERE PROMISES
OF FUTURE PEIU'ORMANCE Olt AS TO FUTURE
CONDITIONS AND COULD NOT BE FHAUDULENT.
FOR THEY DID NOT IUWEH TO A PAST OR PRt£SENT
FACT.

It is well establi::;lred that legal fraud mn::;t he founded on a misrepresentation of past or 11rcsent facts a11{]
that prom.isfs as to fnturc acts or conditions camwt form
a basis of a fraud m· deceit charpe.
"Hepresentntions made by the president of

a rnanufa.cturing company 1o an cmployel' in
solicitiug an aecomodatimr Hott• to temporarily
take care of the c·ompany's overdraft at the bank,
that it would be taken up itt a short iinw, that
the compally had big prospects, and his statement
on renewal that the business of tlrr <·omrHm.v was
imprm·ing C\'Pl'Y <1a:> ditl not amomd to false and
fraudulent repreHentatimr::; of fad."
IrwinH v. \Voleott, 14~J N. vV. (Mieh.) 10:55,
18:3 Michigan ~)2;
Brooks v. Pitts, 100 S. F::. (Ga.) 77G.
"F'raml eannot he p rediea ted upon rcpresPtdations, however fal::->t', which are of a promissor~·
character, or having reference to a future intention of thP party makiitg them, or of possible f'uhue fach;, but only upon falsl~ repre::;entations o!'
any uxi::;ting faet t•itlrer p<lst or prcsL>nt."

Heeord::; \', Smith, 126 N. FJ. (Indiana) :3:33.
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"In the law of torts tlw wroug of der·l~it l'Ollsists in the false statement by words or comluct
of present or past maiL•rial fads, a]](l LloL's not
consist of mere vromises or coujedu res as to future acts or events.''
Brown v. C. A. Pier<'e Uo.,
118 N. 1£. (Mass.) 266.
w_l_1hat wl1ich <lefPn<lant sought to prove, if
it can with propriety be termed a represellta1 ioll
at all, was a representatioll ! hat :'lomething
should thereafter be done. Such a represeHhltiou,
from its natm·e, could not be true or false at till'
time it \Yas llla<le, and if anything, was a contt'<H'1
or promise. 'l'he difference h<•tween a representation that something exists wl1ieh does not, and a
representation that ROHwtltiug· Rhall be done tlwwafter is obvious.''
Knowlton v. Keemw, 11 N. K (MasR.) 127.

"A statement protuissory in its eharal'ter,
that one will thereafter Rell goods at a particular
price or time, will pay money, or do auy similar
thing, or any assurance as to what thereafter shall
be done, or as to any futnre eve11t, is not properly
a representation, but a contract, for the violation
of which a remed~· is to be sought by action ihen•on."
Dawe v. Morris, 21 N. 1£. (Mass.) ;n:l.
"In order to -constitute fraud in law, n~pre
seutntion must he au affirman<·l~ of fact, and llo1
a mere promise or expn•Rsion ol' opinion or illtenti'on. A promise to perform an ;1et. thong·ll ;\('companied at the time with an iuteution not tu

1B
perform it, jt; not suelt a repret'leutatiotl a:,; r·nn be
made the grouud or£ ail adimt for deceit.''
Keithlv v. M uiunl Life hts. Co.,

lll N. E. (Ill.) G03;
l 1'irst Nat'l Bank v. Mar('elle,
194 N. W. (Minu.) 838;
Press v. Hair, 1:);3 lll. App. 528;
Campbell v. l::icm's Coop. dr· Co., 4G Utalt 1.
(at page 14) 148 Pac. 401;
Papanikolas v. ~ampsou, 7:3 Utah 404
at p. 418;
12 Rulittg Case Law, pp. 2:H and 2:)8.
The heart of plaintiff's ease is found in the following
evidcnee.

The witnes:,;, Cha:,;e, testified:

"I told them their mouey waH ahHolutel.'· safe.
that they could draw it out at any time. "' e pnid
them six pereeni inten~st twicr~ a yr'ar and if tlwir
mouey was in for one clay, they p;ot their six percent just the same, aml if anything· e\·er happened
to the store, they would he paid in preference to
any one.'' ( Abs. 22; rrrans. i30).
The plaintiff testifierl:
"'~ '' ' Mrs. Chas0 alwa~-H mentioned tltat
our sa\·ingH was nlmolutr~ly HHfc, and if anything
ever happened t'o the st on~ we~ wonld p;et om·
money in prcfereuee to an)· one ldHr~, in fact. towards the last, as I walked throug-h the officP, a11<l
going upstairs I lwrl to go through het· offi,·e
quite often. an<l T of'tr•n spokP to her about it, slt('
sayH: 'You've got uothing to wony <lhout, your
rnoney is ahHolutely Hafe'." (Abs. 51; Trans. 57).
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If there were ever promi:,;e~ a:; to future eouditioJh
or happenings or promises of future performance, thusl'
statements made to plaintiff bel<mg in ;-;ucb elas;-;ifieatiou.
In addition, the statement that if anything ever lmppened to the stm·e that plni1diff's funds would be pn~
ferred over all other daims i::; one purely of law and 1101
of fact. ("'l'he representation that illl~ vrefenud sto<·k
would (•ome ahead of everything ~was not one of f'ad, but
of law." Beverly v. Richard~, 2:38 N. W. (Mi<·lt.) 270).
And, of .course, .could form no basis for a clung<~ of dceeit.
A study of plaintiff's evidence makes it apparent
that Mrs. Chase's stateme11ts to the plaintiff were llltllll~
late in this loan trausaetion a]](ljust prior io the reeeivership (AlJs. 22; Trans. :n aml :t2) aud loug after plaiHtiff
had madl' the major part of his deposits. (l~xhibit~ A
and B; Mis8 Salisbury made no "deposit" after March
12, 1921) although she rel~eived interest nedih; through
the year8. There is 110 evidence in the reeonl that sueh
statements (OJ' "'l'espresentations" a;,; UCSlg'mtted by
plaintiff) were made to plaintiff w lwu he commene<>d lending· his fuuds to the eompany. In tmth ihe testimony leads
one to believe that these assura11et>s were made to l1im
arfter the Dreyfous administ ra ii on eommem·ed and not
previous to that time. (Abs. :22 and 2:l; Trans. :n ). Allowing these assurances or "repre:,;eutatiolls" t hci r fnll
fm·ee, no ,constructive tmsi ean be implied from thelll
beeausc they were 110t false. '!'hey wen• prmnist>s as 1o
f'uture performance or ;,;ta1emcn1s as to fnturc l'Onditions
and no fra uu element is involved in them.
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3.

THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF' WAS AN EMPLOYEE
OF WALKER BROTHERS DRY GOODS CO. AND BELIEVED

THE

ASSURANCES

OR

"I:EPRESENTA-

TlONS" HEGARDING THE INDEBTEDi\ESS DUE HIM
FROM THE COMPANY CREATED NO COXSTRUCTIVE
TRUST.

rrhat one party to a transadion repose:-; faith and
eonfidence iu tile other party whieh is violated or abused
is no ground for alljudgiug tlwt a trust relatio11 existeu
between them. r:l1 lwre are additional element:-; which
must be present before a oonrt of equity is justified in
l'asting the wrongdoer in i he role of" tru:-;tee ". The usual
remedies on t11c law sidl~ of i he eourt can be entirely
emasculated or de::liroyecl if ihe measure i:-; :-;imply whether the wrongdoer violated a trust. rrlw breach of a ::;imple
eontrad i:-;, in a11 c~t hi l'a l sense, the a lntse of trust and
confidmH'l', but no l'Onri has had the lmnlihood to make
the contral'i hrealwr a "trustee". Althoup;h plaintiil"
was an c•mployee of the cou!pany and believed the assm·aw~es or '' repre::;eniations'' Hwdc• to him that his fnmls
were safe~ and that lw would he a preferred ereditor if
t'he eompany became insolvl~ni, there is no basis found in
these fal·ts whielt operatl' again::;t his plain awl obviou:-;
status of general ereditor. rl'his status was organic in
his tram;actions and ndations with the eomrHm.v aml was
not cl!auged by a:,;surmH·es a::; to his legal status or safety
of his loan io the corporation.
"\Vhen• o1w JH'rson c•mploys another as an
agelli, loans money or sulls property 011 nedit, a
confidenee ami tru:-;t i::; in1posed, to a greater or
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less extent, awl yet such transactions lw.vP tWVL'l'
been regarded by courts as falling· within any recognized claHs of truHlH."
Weer v. Gaud, tltl J llinois -WO.
"The various affain; of Iii"<~ in allllos1 c~\-c'ry
ad between individuals iu tradL' and <·ommPn'c>
involve the reposing of confideuee or trust iu t>adt
other, all<l yet it has never been supposud that lwcause such a confideuee or trust in 1lw intc~grit~·
of another has he en extemleLl and abns<.~d, t ltn t
therefore, a eourt of equity would in all such ca:ws
assume jurisdiction.''
Doyle v.

Mmph~·,

22 Illinois :10:2.

"It is true that uses and trusts an_• a fm·ored
part of the jurisdiction of thP ehancdlor, and fn•quently he will on that ground, deeide in c·asc~s
where the law may he adequate to give rdil~f. But,
notwithstanding this admmdl~dgc>d au1hori1~·, it
<~amwt be extended to every cas<.~ where one ]Hnty
has trusted another, o1· in other vmnb, piHl'l~ a
confidence \Vhich has been a'lmsed. If so, uvur~
ease of bailment, anJ evny im;butel' of ,placing
chattels, by loans or hire, would lll~ swallowt>d up
by e~om·ts of equity. Nay, every case where en>dit,
·was given for debt or Lluty, \\'oul<l soo11 lw dra\\'ll
into the same vortex.''
Ashley's Administrators v. Denlmt,
1 Litt. (Ky.) t\G.
"Something- lllOrc thau a trust r<.>po,;pd in
one is required to make him a 'trustee' al'eording
to its in tent."
People ex rd ,Smit!t Y. Commic<simlt>l',
100 N.Y. ~JG, :J N. K 8G.
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'' ln almost all of the c•ommereial trammdious
of the oountry eoufiLlenee is reposed in the punctuality and iu1egrity of ilw debtor, and a violation
of these is, in a c·onunercial sense, a Jisn~ganl o1
a trust Bn1 this il-l not the relation spoken of in
the fin.;t section of tJ1e act.''
~Wilson

v. Kirby, 1::\1::\ Illiuoit-~ ;J(i();
Chapmau v. l<'orsyth, 2 lloward (1J. N.) 202.

4.

THE AGREEMENT TO PAY INTEREST AND THE
ACTUAL PAYMENT OF INTEREST TO PLAINTIFF ON
HIS ADVANCES TO THE COMPANY, IS A STRONG
INDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF AT ALL TIMES WAS
BUT A COMMON CIUJDITOR OF THE COMPANY.

'rhe fumlmueutals or the trant-~adions between plaintiff and the c·ompany clearly demonstrate that lie loaued
l!is fund:-; to the company and the c·ompauy borrott'erf the
:-;anw holll him. 'l llL~ compauy agreed to pay him .inten'st
1

and did in truth pay tlw interest ( Abs. 22; 'l\·>aus. 30)
for the u:-;e of his funds. There c·an he no trust relatimlship deduC'ed from thii-i agn~ement to pay intm·est. In
truth the agreement to pa.Y intL•n•:-;1 (•Of1Jto1e:-; a debtnot a trust full(!.

''If u

/Jiatt

fHtys interest /or 111one_z; he

must {)(' ettlitled to the use of it.

Wheit

a man locks ttp

money tchich is tllf.ru.stof to him i11 a box, hr~ does not pay
interest Oil it". l11 re Hroad J.'l (Jueew; /Jench Division
740. 'l'he c·ompany lwno\H'd call money from plaintiff.

is the tOIIIf)('iiM1fion paid for tfte use of money.
It is alfo!('ed Oil the .rJrOulld of so/lte r:ontrnct, e;xprcss or
implied, to pay it., or as daJiW/JCS for tltc brew:h of some
confm.cf or flu' riolatioJt of sun1c dul.t;''. Arizona l<~a:-;t
ern H. Co. v. Head, :.!G Arizona :25~), :2:24 Pae. 1057. ''lit-

"l11fercsf
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ferest is the compeusa.tiou allo1ccd U!J late, or ji:rerl U!J the

part,ies, j01· the use or forehearance of IIIOne!J, or as damages for its rLetcntion." 13 R. C. L., ~ee. 1, pa12;e :J.
rrlw agreement of the eompauy to va.v plaintiff ]11terest on his allvarwes to the eolllpauy, plaiul~· slampc:
the trausadiou as one betwem1 debtor aud erc<litor. Upon
reeeipt of his funds the company <·ould Jo what it dl~sircd
with them. It was not to invest them iu a trust fnud !'or
his benefit and then pay him interest on them. It was
iutenued that it usc them iu tlw company business anu
pay him interest for sucl1 usc of hi:-; lllOllcy.
5.

THE VIOLATION OF A CONTHACT DOES NOT OF
ITS OWN FORCE GIVE RISFl TO A CONSTRUCTIVI<l
TRUST.
THERE MUST BE OTHEH l£Ll£MENTS
PRESENT BEFORE A COURT WILL CONVF]'RT
A COVENANT BREAKER INTO A TltUSTEK

If it be assumecl that the eompauy cntm·cd into a
fomwl contract with plaintiff at the tirm it firRt borro\ved his money, wherein it agreed that iu event of iusolveney his elaim would be prefened, we ask how muelt
consideration would be giveu to it as against the rights
of other creditors who Ioaued their nwJH'Y or sold their
merchandise to the emnpany? No sueh agreement is relied upon by plaintiff and yet in facl~ of the fad that he
for years advanced his funds io t lie compau~, and received compensation for their use, it is claimed that as~mrances or "representations" nwdc long- after the establishment of the relatiom;hip marh~ ltin1 a 1wlleficiar.'
under a eoustructi ve tmst. 'rhe difficulties in his cou t l'll-
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tiou are well illusinlted hy the ca:.;e of Blake.v v. Brinson,
decided by Ute 8upremc Comt of the United 8tatcs on

May Hi,

1:n~

aml fou11(1 in Vol. 52, Supreme Court Re-

porter 5Hi-Advance Sheet No. 14, ,June 1, 19:32, was an
adion against the rec~eiYer of a 11atimml bank. VV C quote
the fads from 1\lr..Jush·e Stoue's opiuion (this was a
unanimous dccisiou) :
"Respondent mai11taim~l1 au i11tcrcst-hearinp;
savi11gs a'C<'onnt with tlw hank, in which his credit
hnlanl'e on OetorlJer 14, 1 ~129, was $1 ,9fi1.:n. Shortly lwl'ore t !tat datl•, rcspoll<le11t had had coHversations vvith an offieer of the ba11k, in the course of
which the latter ::;ignified the willi11gm~:->s of the
bauk to pme:w.sc $4,000.00 of United States honds
for responclellt. On October 10, lw stated to rcspondeut that the hallk would scud tn Richlllollll
for the bonds, and asked IJilll to bring- to the lnmk
on the 14th sud1 amouut, i11 additiou to his ert>dit
lmhuH·e, <18 vvould he required to pay for tlw bouds.
On the latter <late re8•pmHlcut drew a <'ltcek for
$2,100 npou m10ther bm1k, which he c1epositP<l i11
his savings aceount, thus increasing his deposit
halauee to $-1-,0ot.:n. 011 ilw 13th, the· :-;ame offi('er of the b<mk informed l'CH'JlOIHh~ut that the
bouds l1ad been ordered, nud on the 1 ~lth said to
him, 'L han~ your homl8 ', awl bawled to him a
charge slip which stated: "rhis is to advise you
that we~ have this da~r ehargcd your aerount a,;
follows:
4,000 l''omth L. L. 411~
Ace. Int.
Commission .

7<

Bonds .

$:3,9GO.OO
.GO
4.00
$:3,964.60
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On Odober 21, the bauk eharged respollllunt 's
savings aceoun t on its books with $:),8G4.fi0, and
ereditcd a lilw atnount as a 'deposit' in a 'lJOnd
account' appearing on it::; books. The bond account contained only a daily reeonl of credits in
the account of dwt•ktl ami depotlih; aml their tohd,
without ally rdermwe t·o respomlPtll or ally other
customer of the bank. The nahu·e and purpos'~
of the a(•e.ount does not otherwise appear. \¥!tl'll
the bank closed its doors 011 (ktober :Z(i, it "Was
discovered that in fad 110 bonds hall been purchased, ordered, m· received for the respondent.
The Ollly transadimtR had with resped to respondent or lti:::; aec.onnt were the ('·OllVl~r.,;atious
with the o£fi.cer of tlw bank and tlw entry of the
debit and cn~dit itcrm; mentioned.
On these fads, Uw Di.,;t ric! Court eonclnded
that the bank had re('eivl'U tltl' $il,D64.GO in trust
for the purpose of purehasi11g the bonds, and
that, as the fund:,; in tlw hmHls of tit<• n•cein~r ha<l
been augmented by tlw wrongful l'Olllltting;liHg of
the trust fund with the otlwr fuu<ltl or the hnnk,
respondent was entitled to pa.vment itt prpferl'll('t'
to the general creditors of the hank. 'l'lte Conrl
of Appeals thong-ht that tlw trnst arose only ou
tlte 19th, when thr bank stated that reRpoudeut 's
a'C<~ount had been eharged with tlw pun·hnsl' pricP
of the bonds, hut rea<'hed Llw same <~onelusion as
respeds the inc:reasu of tht) fumlR iu lite hawb
of the receiver and Htl' right of respondent to
preferential payment. Thu petitioner insists, as
matter of lav\T, that no trust ever came into <~xis-

tenec as the result of t he~P trausaetio11s. : ·:,

=x:

"It would have been equally competent for
respondent to have prO\'i<il~d for tltt• purd1ias(• of
the bonds eitlwr by tlte <·n·aticm of a iruRt of
funds in the hands <;f tlw bank, to he nsl~d for tltat
purpose, 01" by estaulislll1l!J a credit to ue debited
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with the cost of the bonds ll'he11 Jll.tl'(:/iased. But
ouly if the former was the method arloptetl eould
respondent, upon the bank's insolveJJ'~'Y aml failure to pur'clm::w bonds, recover the J'ull(1 or its
proceeds, i<f trcaeeable, in prel'ere11ce to gmwrnl
creditors. ' ~, '' r.l'he relationship e:·dahlislwd between the bauk alHlrespondent by his savings account was, friOJII its inecptim1, that of debtor and
the cTecl.it balance of $1,~)Gl.:n in respondent's <:H'e.ount on October 14 representer1 the amOtmt of
the bank's imlebtc<hwss to him . ., ,,, · 'I'hc situation thus <·reated conti1med ·without elwnge until
tlw Ulth, when tlw hauk's offil·er advised respotH1cid that the bonds had heen pureh ascd. 1f the
advi,ce was true, as respo111lent llelie,·ed it to be.
he was then called upou to pay to the bank the
amount of the pureha:-;e price, and tlte hank proeeeded, with the nssunt of Ute respondent, to
liquidate the supposed obligation by charging his
saving:-; aceoullt with t lie PX<H't amount of the
stated purcltase priee, witlt ini<~n~st and ('Olllllli:-;sions added. vV e can find in this method of diselwrging ·a suprwsed obligation 110 ltint of an intemled alteration of tlw derbtor and creditor rela tio11 ship, with whieh respondent ku l lwt>Jl content front the bep;iitlliug, to that of tru:-;tee and
cestui que trust.
1

'l'he court below thought t!Jat tlH' l<~g·;d eonscqucnee io he attribnte<l to tl1c debiting of tlw
accmmt with the supposed purclmse price of th<'
bonds was tlw same as if the respon<ll~llt had
caslwd a ehel·k for the amount awl lwcl tltcll proeeeded to hand tlH~ monev back to the hank und<'i.
a spoci fi<· agn~l~lttell t between hi 111 and the bank
that the money wns to lH' held as a special fund,
for the sole purpose of eompldinp; the purelmsu.
'!'his view is not wit !lout :-mpport.

•

• •

•

•

• •

*
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8uch a pr·oeeduru, if adually eaniud out,
might afford a basis, which is lacking here, for Uw
inferenee that respomh~tll, uo lo11ger eolll<'lll witJ1
t'hu role of creditor, had sought to establish a
trust fnnd. But the mere debitillg of }Ji,c; ae·eotull,
without more, for tlw reimhursenwnt of tl1P bank
for the obligation which it wns :mppo:-wd to have
ineurred or paid, lends no support to stwh an inference. The eaneellation of tile eredit lmlatH't'
by the debit neither suggests any intention to establish a trust nor points to any identifiable thing·
which could be the subject of it."
vYe quote this dceisiou nt lcng;th

hl~canse

of tlw

similarity of the legal positions of plaiutiff i11 the ease
at bar ami of Brinson in the cited cw.;e. They trusted
their t·espective debto'f's to perform tlwir respe('live al-

le,r;ed agreenwJifs; they depended on their de!Jtors remainillfJ solvent until the a,r;reeJf/CIIfs !r-ae ex.ec1ded.

The.IJ

accepted the promises of their debtors awl their a]Jparent ji1wncial abilities to perform.

The faet that the plaintiff rdiL·d upon tlw eompany's
assurance that his fumls were safe and that he was a
prefened credito:r did not c]wHge tile legal rulati,onsltip
of the parties ill 1·egarJ to funds loaued by plaintiff.
Plaintiff had always beeu a ge11eral <·redi1or of the corporation and he so remained. lle was c·o11teut to remain
in that role and dill not depart from it, and tlte assnran<:c~s

he received from Mrs. Chase, as <'ompany representative, had no effect on this relaticmship. His c·redit
balam·e was not pai<11o !tim, <llld hy him retunwd 1o tlw
eompany on a spe<·ifh: trn::oi so thai partindar fuuds
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were segregated from thP general funds and assets of the
company. As fur( her sustaining appellant's position
there are cited:

N ortltern 8ugar Corporation v. 'I' hom pson,
1:3 :B-,ed. (2nd) 829 ;
Noyes v. Fin;1 Nati,oual Bank,
167 N.Y. Supple. 288;
Craig v. Bnuk .of Granby, 210 Mo. App. :3:34;
-Wetherell v. O'Brie11, 140 Ill. 146;
Mutual Accident Assn. v. Jacobs,
141 Ill. 261;
F'ralick v. Coeur D'Ale11e B. & T. Co.,
3G l(laho 108, 210 Pae. 38G;
Marim~ Bauk v. :b'ultou Ba11k,
:2 -\\'all. (U. 8.) 232, 11 Law. Ed. 786;
Com11wreial Bauk of Penn. v. Armstrong,
148 U. S. 50, l:l Supt. Ct. ;):t3,
:~7 L. F~<l. 3G3;
Minard v. Watts, l8G Fed. 242;
lj'allgatter v. Watts, 11 J1'e<l. (:2ud) :\8:3;
Phoenix Bank v. Hi~-duy, 111 tT. S. 123;
Fidelity As;,;n. v. Hodgers, 180 Cal. G8i3,
182 Pae. -1-2{);
Sclrenek Ctwmieal Co. v. Industrial A. awl
D. Co., 121 N. Y. Supple. t\:38;
YO'rkshiru Investment Co. , .. :b'owler, et al.,
78 :B'ed. (C. C. A.) 5f-i;
Mahle v. Sanel1e,

7~l

N. K (Tll.) D;

Tucker v. Lirner, :'!7 -'\ tlantie (N .•J.
:BJquity) 1017;
Heddingt-ou , .. Lanallilll, e( al.,
3~) Maryland 429.
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G.

THAT PART OF FI~DING NO. 4 (Ol•' BOTH CAUS.bJS
OF ACTION) IfEADING: "SAlD COMPANY * * * IU<JPRESENTED AND STATED * * * THAT MONEYS SO
DEPOSITED WOULD Bh: HJ;jLD BY SAID WALKER
BROTHERS DRY GOODS COMPANY AS A TRUST
FUND IN ORDEH TO ENCOUR;\GE THF~IR SAID EMPLOYEES TO SAVE MONEY" IS WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCJ;~ AND TS CLJ;~ARLY
ERRONEOUS.

If reference is made to thl~ testimouy .of the witness,
Chase, (Aibs. 22, 2:3, 24, 2;), 2G, 27; 'I'nms. :m, :n, :~2,
:3:n; of the plaintiff (Ahs. 50, 51; r:I'rm1s. 55, 5G, 57) and
the witness, Walker (Abs. 7G, 77; Walker Trans. :3G and
~37)

it will be plainly sec>B that no Hueh state111ent o1·
representation as !tnoted above in this finding was evc>r
made to plaintiff or to Mist:~ SalislJmy. At no time was
there ever any mention of any trust fuJI([ "to encourage>
their said employees to savce mom',\"." 'l'his clamw is but
a legal conclusion of com1sel and tlw n~cord is entirely
silent as to an,\· such representation being made to plain-

tiff or to Miss Salisbury.

The follo\Ying eitation is in

point:
'"l'his (•omplaint, in t>ffed al1egl~s, ('ll!Jversi.on
of money b~· defcmlant nnd the fads tlten;ill
stated utterly fail to hriug Hw case within tlw
domain of equity, as tlw elenwnts necessary to
ereato the relation of trnstel' and l'Pstui qm~ trnst
are not shown to exist. Tnw plai11tiff in his eolllplaint designates the mom•y he seeks to re!·over
al:l a trust fund, but this, however, is only thP eoae]usion of the pleader. The rl'lntions of tlw
parties to each otlJN, huennsP of and whit·h .u:ro\\.
oui of the trammetion in qtwstion, mnst bt• deh•rmined by the facts, what ilw:· did ill the pn•mises
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all(! not b~T what the plearlcr
call it in his pleading."

choo~t·s

Francis v. Gishonw, 30 Utah G7,

to laLd or
~n

Pae. 571.

Plaintiff and witness, Chase, prohal>ly did not kll'oW
what was meant hy a "trust fund" and ill all of their
testimony thl'.\' rwYer usucl the words" trust fnurl ". T'nis
dause in :B'ill(1ing 4- (both causes) is taken verbatim from
paragraph 4 (:both causes) of the eomplaint. In addition
to Uw fad that th8re is al)solutely no evidcll'ce to support
it, the clausl~ falls irrto the en·or of attempting to make
a promise-" that m01w:·s so clepositecl 1\'ould lte held
'~ '~ ,,, as a trust fund''-for future performauee, do the
work of a representatiorr of a past or present fad. (Sec
parngraplr :2 of this section of brief.)
From the foregoing discussion and authoritie:-; it rs
submitted:
l. '!'hat plaintiff's co!llplaint does not state a cause
of action entitling him to elailll a prefererH·e in the payment of his c·laim all(! lwm·e defendant's ohjuction to thP
introduction of eYidt>uce should haYe been sustainerl;
'l'lrat the evidence shows ilrat plaintiff \\'a:-; at all
timcl'l a simple coni rad <' redi tor of \Valkcr Br:ot hers
Dry Goods Comparry, \\'ithout right of prcferenec;
2.

:L

cxisb;.

1'hat uo eon:-;tmctiYe

tru~t

in favor of plailltif'{'
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II.
THE FUNDS PAID BY PLAINTIFF TOW ALKER BRO'l'HERS DRY GOODS COMPANY WERE NOT HELD IN
ANY SPECIAL DEPOSIT OR FUND, BUT WERE INTERMINGLED AND CONFUSED WITH THE INDIVIDUAL OR CORPORATE FUNDS OF THE COM.p ANY AND WERE USED IN THE COMPANY BUSINESS. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRACE AND IDENTIFY THE FUNDS OF PLAINTIFF AS ENTERING
INTO SOME SPECIFIC PROPERTY, SECURITY OR
ASSET OF THE INSOLVENT CORPORATION
WHICH CAME INTO THE HANDS OF THE RECEIVER.
HENCE, EVEN IF A TRUST WAS
CREATED IT MUST FAIL AND PLAINTIFF IS BUT
A GENERAL CREDITOR.

Assignments of error 7(h, i, j nnd k), 8 (hand d),
9 (c, d and c) ancl17 (c, cl and e) involve the above proposition of law.
There is positive evidmwe in i he re(~.onl as to thv
methods pursued by the company in handling funds
loanvd to the company hy i·ts emplo~'Pes.
'rhe employee "deposits" after having beeu received
hy the compa11y were comming-led indisniminately with
funds of the compan~· receive(l from its daily sales and
other sources. (Ahs. :30 awl :n; 'Jlnms. :38 alHl :39). 'rhcse
company funds were deposited daily in the bankt->, and in
making up tlll' deposits no distinction as to funds representing employees' savings alld fuwis representing sn let->
were made. 'Phey were all pu( togd!Jer. 'Jllw company
had no speeial bank al'(•ount in which i lte employees'
:-;avings \V(~re kept alonP. (Ahs. :n; 'rrans. :3~l; Ahs. :14;
Trant->. 42). ThL• l'mployees' savings were not ear-

mm·kecl. (A!Js. :32; 'l'nuis. 40). The eomp:my nwilliaillell
several banking depositories awl whe11 ill<' eredii bal-

ance in fnvor of the

<'Olllp<m~·

in a particular lHmk woul<l

reach a certain point, a tinte certifienle of deposit would
he purchased from such bm1k. (Ahs. 32; 'l'ralls. 40; Ahs.
:::lG; '!'ralls. 43), but at no time wm; a certificate of deposit purchased which l'tmlained mlly the l'uJI(ls of employees whi<·h had !Jeell paid over to the eompan.L (Abs.
iU; Renshaw Tram;. 40). 1'hesc e€~rtifiea tes of deposit
Wl'rc '' l'l1Wl'geucy funds'' alHI we1·e intended to take· eare
of "anything in all ell'el'gt'llCy." c.\bs. 76; \Valkel' Trans.
iH"i).

'J'lwn~ \\'l~l'l~

no tinw <·ertifil'atcs of deposit ownell by

the company 011 <laic of lite appoinimuut of the n~eeiVl'l'.
They had all heeu ('aslwd prior to that date all<! used in

the company

lm:,;im~ss.

( Abs. ::7; T ntll s. 44).

"\\'hen it came io making deposits no distinctio1J as
to fundt-; l'l'lll't~senting employees' savings and funds
represent iug the sale:-; was made. 'I' he:· wen• all put
togethe1·." (. \bs. ::o n ud :n ; Tnms. :lH aud :-l!l). 'l'inw
dcpof>il l'l'rtificates Wl~n· aequired with lm11k nedits,
whieh l'OlltaiH('d g"l~uernl re<·l'ipls of 1he l'Ompau:· a11d tlH·
emplo~'l'l' loa 11s. ( Abs. :n ; 'I' raw,;. 40).
It tcilf {Jc 11oferl t ha1 i11 caclt tllstaJtcc flu; funds represent i·ng employee luaus ?.cere dcprn;itcd iu com pa1111
ua11ks. '!'ltere is no euideuce that any other d·ispositio11
or usc tccrc er<'J' uwde of t!teJJI. 'l'lw oblif,!;aiion~ of the
l'Ompa uy were paid from the l'Oilllll on hmd at t lw hank-;,
(·Olttposed

.JB).

of

re<'cipls from all

BOtll'l'CH. (All~.

-!1; 'l'nllls .
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The legal principle::; involved

111

llw ;-;it11ntion pn·-

1-leilted by the evideuc·e iu tltil-l case camwt lw sulJjeet to
auy serious dispute. The ::-;upnmw Court of Ctal1 li:1:;
definitely elucidated the rules of law which govem iii
this jurisdiction. 'l'he appellant therefore submits l he·
following authorities, which support its position as sei
forth above.
'"l'lw d()(·triue of equity, as regards prOJllH·ty
disposed of by persow; i11 :1 fidtwiary position,
is that whether the disposition of it he rig·htful
or wrongful, the hemdieial 0\\'llUr is entitled to
the proeeeds, whatever he their form, provided
only he ean ·identify f hen1.. If they emmot he
identified, by reason of thu trust mmwy heiug
mingled with that of the tmstr~e, then Uw cestui
que trust is entitlerl to a el:argu upon the new
investment to the exteut oft he trust lllOJWY inH·ea·ble into it; that there is no distindiou hutwuPu all
express trustee and all agc~ut, or bailee, or eolledor of reuts, or anybody elsu in a fiduciary
positio11, ancl that there is 110 di ffereuee between
iuvestmeuttJ iu the pun·lwse of lands, or clwttrds,
or boucltJ, or loans, or lllOnl'_YS lleposited in a hm!lz
account.''
ISir Geo .. Jest>el, Ma~tur of tlw Rolls; quotud
with approntl ill National Rmk VH. Tnwrance Co., 104 tT. S. G8, and adopted
as the rule in LJtah iu Waddell vs. ~Wad
dell, ;w Utalt .t:lG; 10.t Par•. 74:l.
'"l'lw eourt~ ha \'l~ fruq ueutly eo11siden•d and
upo11 claims like the otw hufon~ ns, lm\
we know of uo ea~e wlwn• it ha:-; h('l'll lwld that :t
tru:-;t could Ill~ impn•ssr·d on propPdy or fuud:-;
where it is ('Om·ecled to lw iutpos~ihle to inLCl' <•r
pas~ed

34

ideutify the property or fumls, eit Iter in its orig
inal or ::;nbstitnted form *' * ·
It was not held
in the Waddell case (:Hi Utah .,!.;);)) nor iu auy
other, so far a:-; we are a\\'are, thai a ('Onrt has
e\·e1· im}Jn~ssml, or has attempted to impress, n
trust upon l'L'l·iain}H'operty or upuu a certaiu l'und
where the original trust property or trust fnnd
ea11 no longer be tnH·ed or identified, eiU1er i11
its original or suil:.;tituted fonu."
Kent vs. Km1t, 30 l)tah ±4, Hi3 Pae.
15 L. H. A. (N. ~.) 1100.

~71,

''Whenever a trust fund has been wrongful] y
converted into another specic8 of propert~·, if it:-;
ideutity ean lll~ traeed, it will be held, in its 1ww
form, liable to 1lw right::-; of the cestui que trust.
No clulllge i11 it::; state and fonn enn divest it ol'
such trust. No long as it l'an he ideutiticll, either
as the original property ol' the eestui que trust,
or as tlw produd of it, equity will follow it; and
the right of reclamation attaches to it uutil detaehed by t!Je SUlll~l'iOJ' equity oJ' a boua fide IJUl'e!Jaser, for a valuable eo11sicleration, without notice. 'J'he substitute for the original thi11g follo\\',.;
the nature of the thiug itself ::-;o lollg as it ('<lll lw
at>certained to be su('h. But the rigl1t of pursuing
it fails when thp mea!ls of ascurtaimnml! fails.
'rhis is always tlw l'<t:-lt~ whL~It thu suhjl~l·t matter
is turned into moJJP,\' alld mixei1 nud eoufouuded
in a geucral mass of property of the ::-;auw description.''
'rlwmpson 1\ ppeal

:2~

Penn. Ntate Hi.

"A trust en~ditor is not L~utitll'd to a preferover gmwral (']'editors of the insolvent merely on the ground of the natnre of his clai111. To
authori?.l~ sw·lt a prci'l'l'CIH'e, some specific recoguiJ~ed l~(luity founded on the relation of the <lcbt
C:lH'l'

35
to the assets in the hands ol' the a:-:si~uet• or
receiver, and whi(·!J entitles the• d<lilll<lllt, according to equitable principles, to a pn·ferenec~ ill paymeut out of tlw:-:c assub, nm:-:t he estahlislwd ll\
evidml<'e. rrhe person clailllillt~· to IJp ll trnsj ('1'(··ditor lllnst in order to ustalllish his ri~~·llt to :1
preferem·e, trace the trust money i11to SOltll' specifie property, fund, securit~·, or :H·<·ount ol' tllL'
i11solveut whi<·ll has passed into the l!nllds oi' tiH·
receiver or nssigm~e, ;md tll(' proceed:-: of wllil·l,
arc to he distributed. lie must ideutil\· tl1c~ fuud
out of whieh he demands to he prdL~r;·t~d in distribution ei thcr as the origiwtl trnst prope rt.\· or
as a product of it ~, * ~, Tlw right to punnw tlw
fund fails whm1 the nwaus of i<leutii\ing and ascertaining it fails.''
Groff vs. City ~a vings WmHI & ']'rust Co ,
46 Penn. Ruperior Ct. 42:l;
Lifter vs. F~arl Go., /(i Penn. Superior Ct.

173;
Corporation Commissiou v. l\lercllants Bank
& Co., 1:38 ~. E. 2:3 ( S. C.)
"The authorities arc generally agreed t I! at
t.he right of tile <·cstui qnP trust to reclnim trusi
funds in speci(~, or impress n trust upon other
property in the hands of the trustee, is founded
upon ihe right of property amlnot 011 the grounds
of compensation for its loss, allll heiieC' tl1c henl'fieiary of a trn:-;t fund is not entitled, lllerely lweause of the <·haracter of its l'lnilll, to pa~·nll•nts
out of the insolvent trustN~ ':-: assets in prei'L~I'l'lll'l'
to general creditors, hut llll!st trace m1d itlc•ntif~·
the trust funds iu ordl'r to I'l'dailll them * ~, ''' .
'l'lwre arc, however, wnll-cstallli:-dJed prim·iples
whieh govern the duties of a eestni qm' 1rns1, a:-;
depositor in a hank, \',·ho st•Pk:-: io tract• and n't•laim his fund. lt is wt>ll :-:<•ttll'd thni, wlll'll <l
trustee vuongfully l'Ollltningles trust fuuds \\·itlt
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his own funds, l~quity will impress the trust 11pon
tlw entire Jttass with wlticlJ the tmst fuud has
been <~olmlliugled in order to }Jermit tlw reC'larnation of th<o trust fuml. \Ya<ldell \'. Waddell, >Hi
Utah, 433, 104 P. 74:~. 'rl!e leading ('ase in \vhicl!
t!Je priueiples applieable to this situation W<'l"L:O
annoumed is the I'~nglislt case of Ju re I lallct 's
1 1~state, 1:3 Law Hep., Chancery Div. ()~)Ci. There
the rule wm; laid down, which has sinee heeu followed with almost uuhrokeu nnifonnit.\', that thl•
cestui que trust will uot h<o eall<~d upou to identif.\'
particular money <·.onstituiing his trm;t fund, hut
that, if tlw trustee has mingled the trn::;t fuwh;
with his own, the en tire mass is impresse< l with
the trust to the extent of the amount of the trust
funds, awl, \\'hen• the trustee has made payments
from the mingled fund he will he presumed to
have expended for his own use aud benefit, first,
his ow11 money, and, lastly, tlte trust fniHl, and
that the eestui que trust will lle permitted to recover from sul'h mingled fund, awl in prefen'llr"l'
to conunon <~reditors, the auwunt of molley repreHenting the lowest halam~e to whiell the tniugled
fund fell from the inception of the trnHt to tlw
date of iut-lolnmey. rrhere may lw some qualifications to thi:-; g<'Iwrnl rule, but, so far as this
(~ase is cow·enwd, the principles stated are applil'able. 'l'!Je rule is al:-;o stated as follows:" 'l'hL~
sm11e rule as to identifying or tracing !he fulllls
HJ!plies to pub}i(• as to privai<~ fund,;. rrhe mone,Y
must lw identified or tnwud i11to somu other spe.l'ific fund or property. There is a presumption,
lwwm·er, that what remains at tlte time of insol\'euey is a trust fund. The law presumes tltat
trust fnnds wen~ not appropriated and that a balance of eash in thl• !Jan<lH of the depository is thu
trust fuwlH." 22 H. C. L. 2:~1.

"lu t·HS<' tlt(• miuglud fnud is sufticiC'nt to pay
!lte trust claimaut iu full, tlw pn•suntptiol! is that
only the uwney of the trustee lms been expended,
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but, where the trustee lms l'XJH'Hdc·d, not only his
own money out of the mingled fnud, but has also
dipped into and expeudcd pari of the trust fuud,
Nw trust elaimant will he entitled io recover ollh
the amomd \\'hich remaim;, all(] hv is eutiilc•d t'o
rec,over this, ev<'ll though 1he halaneu is less than
the total of the trust fund."
Tooele County Board n. lladloek, 11 I'<H'.
(2nJ) at pgs. il24 and :l2fl.
"But aside fr01n i his Yil~w of tlw t•YidPJH'<',
the elaim to a general eharge upon au.'· aud all
propel"ty a<-quired by the hoard, through thv u;.;<~
of the general funds of the hank with whil'h this
trust fuliCl bas been blended is not supported h.'
the weight of antlwrity; uor do the eases dt~eid<~d
hy this eourt go so far. rrlmi til<· misw.;e of this
trust fuwl has goiJC to H\H~ll, i11 one~ form or an·
other the general assets of the hank, is noi enough
to charge the whole with a lieu, will noi h<• seri~
ouslv conte;.;ted. Thl• easl's \Yllich dt'llV sneh :1
eout.eutioll arc unmerons. To iiii}JI"I's.~ a fntsl

upon the pmperty of a tort feasor u-lw /i((s used
the trust fund in his private Clj!"airs it must h('
traced iu its original slwpe or sulnditu.fed fonil."
Cnnvford County

\'S.

Htraw11, lG7 11'ed. (C.

C. A.) 1100, 1S L. H. A. (N.H.) 100;
Schuyler vs. Litilefield, ~:)2 U. N. 707.
"But we believe tile majori1.'' doet1·inC' i:-o:

based upo11 soun<l prineiph•s :wd should lK• adhered to. Where uo spef'iiie lieu is <·rented by
eontract, or acts of 11It' parti<~s, HOJW exists. Tlie
only eonr:-;e opc•11 to equity is to diseovt•r the corpus of the irnsi fund or io follow th0 ehang·<·s of
trausmntationi'l of tlw 1rust lliOJH'\"H into ,;om<•
particular property or fund t II at c<lll he <"II a rgt•d
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with tho trust, saving of l'Ourso tho rights of in·
nocout purchasers for value.''
-:\Iyers, Hel·eiver v. Matusek, 9t\ Florida at
p. 1145, 125 Southom i360.
"rrhe result of these decisions is that lllereh·
showing that the trustee has n~cei\'ed trust funds
will ngt impress a lien upon his assets unless it is
shown that his asset \Von~ not innensed bv tlw
misappropriation. But the great weight o'f authority is against this view.''
Perry on rrrusts, (7th Eel.) Sec. 83G.
"'Vhen trust money becomes BO mixed up
with the trustee's individual funds that it is impossible to t raee and identify it aH entering into
SOme specific property, the trust cea:';eS. rrhe COUrt
will go as far as it ean in this tracing ancl following the trust mouey; but when as a matter of fad,
it cannot be traced, the eqniiahle right of tlw
cestui quo trust to follow it failR. Under su('h
eircmnstanees, if the truioltec~ has bl~come bankrupt, tl1e conrt eunnoi say that tl!(• trust money
is to he found somewlwre in the general estate
of tho trustee that still remains; he~ ma~· han•
lost it with prorwrty of his O\Yll; and in such ease
the eestui que trust can onl.\· coll!e in and share
with the general ereclitors."
Little vs. OlwdwiC'k, 131 Mass. 109,
K 1005, 7 L. R. A. 370.

~;~ ~

"As a consequence there have been doeisiou:-:
iu some Ameriean states to tho effect that if onP's
general estate has been onril·lwd br tho JJI"oc·ec>ds of
trust propc~rty, the tru:::t may 1w estahlished
against tho gCI~eral a:-;sets c·vc•n though thu estatl·
is iusolveut * *
But these eases have been
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either expres:,;ly overruled or gn~atly limited al)(l
qualified. * * * In some states it has heen lwld
that, ,,·hile it is uot enough to slww tlmt 1lw t l'llt-Jt
property we11t in to tlw general at-Jsetc;, ii i:-;
enough to eharge tl1e \\·liol<~ <~state with a trust,
if it can Lc showu that tlw J!l'ot·ccds l'l'lll<tiut•d 1111expewle<l soJnewlwrc in the et-Jtat<•. '' ,,, · But b.r
the great weight of autlwrit~-, a ! ru:-;t t•mmot ))('
estahlislled against the procc<~ds of trust pl'Operty, which has heClt disposed of, unlc:-:s t lw proceeds <'Hit he identified ami tral'ed iuio sonw spceific ftmd or property. '!'his it-1 tl1e do!'triup of ln
re Hallet's Estate (l:l Ch. Dw. Wu) to \Ylticl1 \YI'
have already referred.''
Lowe v. Jones, Hl:2 ;\] nss., !l4, It-\ N. K ·~:2
G L. R. A. (N. S.) 487;
Atkins vs. Atkins, 180 N. K (Mass.) (it:L
"Before a eestui qne tmst <"<lit dnint spe<·ific
real or pen;oual property, lH~ mu:.;t sho\N that it
is tlw irlentical property origimllly eovcred h~
the trust or that it is the frni! or product llwn~·of
in a new form.''
Lathrop v. Bamptou,

:n Califomia :2:2.

"To justify a re<·over~- n hencficiar.'· mnst
he able to follow and identify tlie prop<~rt:v l'itltc•J'
i11 its original or suhstituted form."
Oreutt vs. Gould, 117 Cal. :n;), 4~) Pa(·. lHR:
glizade v. Elizade, 1:l7 Cal. Gi14, (j(j Pac.

369;
IDsta te of Arms, lUH Cal. 334-:
!Iollaud vs. Bauk of Italy, 1 Pal'. (:lwl)
1031.
"It i:,; uot c•uonglt that the K·date of Ll'tnon
may have heeu indirectly inereHsl'd hy n•Hso!J oi'
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hit; having Ut\ed the trust fund to pay his own
debts.''
l\lartin Vt\. Smith, ;3;3 Idaho 692, 197 Pae.

82:).
"rl'he right of a beneli(·iary to reelaim a trust
f"ullCI is based upon his right of property, not
npo11 any right as a preferred ereditor of the
trustee.''
Chat\e & Baker Co. \'. Olmsted, 9:i Wash.
:i06, 160 Pac. 962;
lleidclhark v. Campbell, 93 Wash. ()61, Hi4
Pac. 247.
"rrlw proof does not definitely trace the proceeds of the sale of the eoJJvcrtcd property into
the cash on ham! or into any speeifie assets of the
bank. Jt merely shows that the proeeeds of these
securities \Yellt into and swelled tlte assets of the
bank, nud thereafter they vYere used as all other
assets in the ordinary operation of the hank. Under sueh circumstanees, the judgment of the court
was erroneous in impressing a trust on the entire
assets of the bank."
Tyler County State Bank v. Shivers, 6 S.
W. (2nd) (Texas) 108;
Prior v. Davis, Administrator, J 09 Alabama
117, 1 ~) South 440;
i\lattl•r of Cavin vs. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 25ti;
Maged v. Bank of United States, 2i)4 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 295, 254 N. Y. Suppl. 569;
Schneider vs. ~Winchester Developmmtt Co.,
14~) Atlantic (N. :J.) 636;
Commonwealth vs. Tradesmen's Trust Co.,
D:i Atl. (Pa.) 574;
0 'Neil vs. Clrvelawl, 22:) ~. \V. (Wisconsin) 82;
Hainwater \'S. Wildman, 289 S. ¥l. (Arkan-

sas) 488.
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'l'hc testimony of 1\Lrs. Chase aud .J. H. \\'alhr shows
without qualification that all cmvloyccs' savings deposits, after being iutcnuinglcd and ~onfuscd with t·orporatc funds rc('eived fro111 all other sources, were deposited iu one or more of the bankiug depositoriL•s ol'
the ~ompauy. There was no speeial bank aceonnt (o reeeive tl1cse employee deposits, and they were ~onsidered
as part of the general funds of the company for usc in
its business adivities. 'l'he evidcneu further shows that
these hank eredits were drawn upon without ref'ermwL•
to the source of origi11 of the credits. 'I'hc general obligations ami expense of operation were paid from them,
ami wlJCn an employee "depositor" desired to "withdraw" any of his "deposits" they were given a <·llc•C'k
upon any of the depository banks without regard to thr•
souree of the funds on credit. (Abs. 41; 'l'nms. 48).
On the assumption that plai 11 tiff's funds or saving:--:
wl1e11 paid to the eompany becanw a trust fnll([ aml nut
<l debt (we have elcarly dernoushated above the eno:·
of snch a:-;sumptiou) the first step plaintiff is ~ompelled
to take is to trace these funds from the iutcnuinp;lc•d
bank aceouuts where they llatl hceu eoufusccl with othei·
corporation funds. '!'his he U'flparcntly attempted to do
by testimony of Mrs. Cha:-;e, aml of .T. R \Yalker regardiug time eertificatcs of deposit. (Ahs. 75, \Valker Tra11s.
:J5; Ab:,;. 7G, Walker 'l'rm1s. :Hi and :37; Abs. :27, 'l'nu1s.
:l4; All:-;. :29, 'l'rans. iHi). lu order to conned tlw employees' dL•posits wiil1 thest; tillll' r·m·tifi<'ates of deposit
\\'aJker testified (Abs. 78; \\'alkcr 'l'raus. :l7):
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A. "\\'ell, we had those spe<·ial deposits
there to take care of the special accounts and
o1 her items as 1 s1 a ted before, those special a<'<'ounts were the ouly liability we had that was due
on demand.''
~In;.

Chase stated (Alm. 29; Trans. 3G) :

A. 'n"Phis is what I meant by 'emergew·y';
\\'e had :,;ome employees that had, say as high as
ten thousand dollars deposited, if they should
waut io draw that teu thousalHl out, hut "'e didn't
have the 11101\ey in our checkin,r; accouut, rw in the
tilt, we eould draw it out of this emergen<'y account to pay them, this speeial accouut, if 'We had
to do that."
From this and like testimouy it is evident that plain
tiff is attelllpting to elaim that these time certifieates of
deposit were a trust fum! to protect the employees' saving "deposits", hut it should be noted that even 011
]llaiutiii':,; ow11 evidence this position must fail, because
(a) Walker in his ow11 testimouy admits
these time l'ertifieates of deposit were "a reserve
accrJ11nt to take care of anything ·in an emergency"
( Abs. 76; Walker rr raus. i3G) awl "we had those
special deposits there to take eare of the special
accounts and other items * * * " CAbs. 78; vValker
Trans. ~7).

(h) 1lrs. Chase states if "we didn't haz:e
tltat moHC.IJ in om· checking account or 'tn the till''
we eould draw it out of this emergency aeeouut
to pay them. ( Abs. 29; Tra11s. :3G).

'l'heso staiemmtis belie ihe claim that the time ecrtificntes of ucposit were a trust fuud soi up to protect the
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0mployees' savlllg

"dl~po::;its",

because they

n~veal two

definite fads which iu tlwmselve:,; contradi<·t plaintiff'.-;
theory: First; Ow time certifiea ie::; were to p roteet "any-

thiuy in au I'IIU'r.fJency"; all(! secondly; "withdra\Yals"
hy employees were made frmu these time eertificatcs ou[_,.
if "1ce didn't have that 1nouey in ow· dteekilt,r; accott.JI!
or i11 the till." llow can it be sue<'essfully claimed that
the time certificates were a trust fund for tile bmwfil
of the employee "depositors'' when the:,;e two admissiouc;

n re made'?
However, m;ide from the iutrinsie condition of plaiutiff's evideuce, plaintiff must depend upon Mrs. Chase'-;
testimony given below to show that the employees' saYing funds went into the time certific-ates (.fubs. :31; 'l'ram.;.

40):

"Q. You didn't ear mark that tnouey so it
would go right over to the Contineutal to pay a
time certifiea te, did you t
A.

No.

Q. Yon didn't car umrk it ;;o it \\'ould be 1\h.
Henshaw's to buy a <'Criificate of dl'JWHit, did you!

A.
Q.

No.

A.

Yes.''

But that
indiscriminately?

aud also (A hs.

;~5

Wl'IIL

into tlw general <Wl'Ount

and ;3(;; 'l'ram. 4:3) :

"Q. \Ylwt wa;; t lip pr;u·t in• i 11 hn.Yi 11g tll('S('
ti11w certifi<·ate;; of' dl•posit, lw\\· ol'tL•n would _,·ou
buy thcru "?
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A. I don't remember.
Q. vVould you do the actual purcha;.;ing of
them, or would \Valker or Dreyfous, or who attended to that f
.A. Well, the Manager of the store would tell
us \Vhen to get them.
Q. And then you would draw a ehcck on
your general account t
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Depending, one time if the National Copper had a surplus balance, yon would huy the certificate of deposit at that bank?

A.

Yes."

'rhis evideuee clearly shows that (a) time certificates of deposit were purchased from the general bank
<tccounts of the company and that (b) no certificates were
purchased whieh represented employees' ''deposits'' exelusively. Jt is left to guesses and surmises as to whether
or not these tillle eertificates of deposit were purchased
with plaintiff's funds. 'rhe chances arc equal as to
whether or not any of his funds \\Tent into the time cerWieate;-;. Certainly there is no positive and direct evidence that sueh was the faet. 'J1he most favorable aspoet of plaintiff's evidence at this point leaves it to ·t
matter of conjecture.

If, howeYer, we accept a pure assumption or

gue~:s

t II at plaintiff's funds went into time certificates, the next
step in tracing the fund;-; is wholly fatal to plaintiff's
(·ansc for note :\lrs. Chase';-; cvidmH•e: (Ahs. :37; 'rrans.

44):
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"(l. You want ~-our evidmwe to :-;taud tlta1
at ihe time the receiver was appointed, there \YCI"l'
no time certificates 1
A. No, none then.''
ami ab;o (Ails. :37; '!'ram;. 44).

''Q. But you know tltere
tmwe at that time'?

A. N' ot
lt

\H~re

uoJw m e:-us-

at the time of t l1e ret'eiver.''

therefore plain thai prior to tlte date the receiver was appointed, tlwsc certifi<"atcs of deposit had
been cashed and the proeceds used ju the trausac~tiou of
the company business. Ce1·twinly no time certificate,,·
IS

came into the hands of the receiver.
tiff's trust fund search.

Thus cuds plainHe can go no further ill hi;.;

proof.
Under the authorities cited above aud iu aecordam•t•
with the Utah rule, plaiutiff must trace his money into
some specific fund or property, aud ''\\'here the origiual
trust property or trust fulld call uo longer he~ traced or
identified eitl1er in its original or suhstituted form'' the
trust fails ami plaintiff stands m; a general creditor. He
mmnot elaim a lieu ou tlw geueral assc•t s of tlw ('Orporatioll, for the Utah Supreme Comt lim; expressly and emphatically adopted the majorit_y rulu whi('h refuses to c•xteud the priuei pl e of tracing truK t fnud,; heyowl its
logical st·opc. 'l'he evidem·c~ shows iha t (a) Plain-tiff\.:; funds were• intt~rmi11glt~d all(! <'onfnsed with
111L~ iucollle from all othc~r som·(·es and thus (•oufmwd \H'I't'

depm;ited in one or more of the eompany hanks; (b) that
it may be only conjectured that all or some part of plaintiff's funds were usetl to purchase time certificates of
deposit, <llld (c) all time certificates were cashed and
usl~d in the eompany business and none reached the lmnd:::
of the receiver.
Under the rule mmonnced in Utah in the Kent easl'
(~mpra)

and Tooele Bank ease (supra) (and which is the

majority rule), plaintiff has failed to trace any of his
funds into property or assets of the receivership estate,
but l'Onira has shown that if the funds found their wav
into the time eertifin<te::; of deposit, all sneh eertifieates
had been cashed and the proceeds expended prior to the
appointmeut of the receiver. Renee, the so-called "trust
fnn<l '' failed

~when

the means of tracing it failed.

His

right to follo·w his alleged "trust funds" failell wit II
proof that none of the certificates of deposit real'hell
the reeeiver's hands. The certifieates were the end of
his trail. He made no proof that any of hi::; fuucls were
a part of the assets of the company w hieh the reeei ver
reeeived. His proof was directed towards the certificates of deposit and when his trail ran blinll be canum
110\Y retrace his steps in the direction of the general assets of the eompany and claim a preferred lien thereon
because he has no claim on the general assets (other th<lll
that of n eornmon creditor) upon his failure to idcn ti f\
his alleged "trust funds" either in its original or tran;.;muted form.

47
From the foreg•oing discu(-;sio11 Ow following conelu::-;ions are logical:

I.
'l'he plaintiff Renshaw all(l his assiguor, May Nalisbury, were at all times common ('!'editors of Walker
Brothers Dry Goods Company. 'l'hne was 110 fidueinry
relationship between them aml the <·ompany. 1'liCy intended the company to use thei1· funds in the 001Hlud. ol'
its business and in return re<'ei n~ eom pens at ion in the
form of interest.

II.
If the funds paid by plaintiff and M.iss :Salisbury to
the eompany were trnst fuwls, tlwy became so intermingled ami confused with other funds of' the compally
that their identity has been lost and plaintiff failed to
tracP them into any property or assets

<~~oming

into the

hands of the receiver; hence lw will be relegate<! to the
position of common creditor.
lt i::-; submitted that the judgnwnt in this <'ase allowing plaintiff a preferenee, should he reversed, with
iu::-;trudions to the trial court to enter judgment decn•eiug· him and his as::-;ignor to he common cnxlitors without
preference.
Hespectfully snblllitted,

Rl'I'ER & COWAN,
\VIIA::;oN AlcCAH'l'll Y,
"1 ttonteys for lJefnulrtJd

and

~1ppellant.

